In this paper, we obtain the tight approximation guarantees for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2, improving the previous best known result of 3. Our bound is tight with respect to either the optimal offline benchmark or its fractional relaxation. We also present a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of 3 against the fractional optimum, improving the best known result of ( √ 2 + 2) against the weaker integral benchmark.
INTRODUCTION
In a typical procurement setting, a buyer wants to purchase items from a set A of agents. Each agent i ∈ A can supply an item (or provide a service) at an incurred cost of c i to himself, and the buyer wants to optimize his valuation for the set of acquired items taking into account the costs of items. Because the agents may strategically report their costs, this setting is usually considered as a truthful mechanism design problem.
These problems have been extensively studied by the AGT community. The earlier work analyzed the case where the buyer's valuation takes 0-1 values (see, e.g., [5] ) in the frugality framework, with the objective of payment minimization. A more recent line of work on the budget-feasible mechanism design (see, e.g., [24] ) studies more general valuation functions with a budget constraint of B on the buyer's total payment. Our work belongs to the latter category.
The research in the budget-feasible framework focuses on different classes of complement-free valuations (ranging from the class of additive valuations to the most general class of subadditive valuations), and has many applications such as procurement in crowdsourcing markets [26] , experimental design [18] , and advertising in social networks [25] . For example, consider an online crowdsourcing platform (like Amazon's Mechanical Turk), where a buyer may hire multiple workers to perform certain tasks like image labeling, text translations, or writing consumer surveys. The central problem for these online labor markets is to properly price each task, because the buyer is usually budget-constrained, and would run out of the budget once he pays too high to the hired workers.
This setting corresponds to the most basic additive valuation of the buyer, which is the topic of our paper. I.e., we assume that every hired worker i ∈ W generates a value of v i ≥ 0 to the buyer, whose total valuation from all the hired workers W equals to v(W ) = i ∈W v i . Without any incentive constraints, this naturally defines the Knapsack optimization problem:
Find workers S ⊆ A: max S ⊆A v(S) = i ∈S v i , subject to i ∈S c i ≤ B. In the budget-feasible framework, the goal is to design truthful 1 direct-revelation mechanisms that decide (1) which workers W ⊆ A to select and (2) how much to pay them under the budget constraint. A mechanism is evaluated against the benchmark of the optimal solution to the Knapsack problem.
For the above problem with the additive buyer, Singer [24] presented the first 5-approximation mechanism. Later, the result was improved by Chen et al. [11] with a ( √ 2 + 2)-approximation deterministic mechanism and a 3-approximation randomized mechanism, which still remain the best known upper bounds to the problem for nearly a decade. Besides, the best known lower bounds are ( √ 2 + 1) for the deterministic and 2 for the randomized mechanisms [11] 2 . On the other hand, Anari et al. [4] studied an important special case of large markets (i.e., the setting where each worker has vanishingly small cost compared to the buyer's budget) and acquired the tight bound of e e−1 . Fractional Knapsack. Interestingly, all previous work on budget-feasible mechanisms for the additive buyer actually obtained results against the stronger benchmark of the optimal solution to Fractional Knapsack 3 , i.e., the fractional relaxation of the Knapsack problem. Indeed, although Knapsack is a well-known NP-hard problem, its fractional relaxation admits efficient solution by a simple greedy algorithm, and generally has much better behavior than the integral optimum. We also compare the performance of our mechanisms to the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Our Results. We propose two natural mechanisms that both achieve tight guarantees against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Namely, we prove a 3-approximation guarantee for a deterministic mechanism and a 2-approximation guarantee for a randomized one. Given the matching lower bound of 2 even against the weaker Knapsack benchmark, the guarantee from our randomized mechanism is also tight against the standard benchmark. Our results establish a clear separation between the powers of randomized and deterministic mechanisms: no deterministic mechanism has an approximation guarantee better than ( √ 2 + 1), whereas our randomized mechanism already achieves a 2-approximation.
We propose a new natural design principle of two-stage mechanisms: in the first stage, we greedily exclude the items with low value-per-cost ratios 4 ; in the second stage, we use the simple 1 Typically, there are no assumptions in the literature about prior distribution of agent costs. Truthfulness condition means that the strategy of reporting the true cost is ex post a dominant and individually rational strategy for every single agent. 2 There are gaps for both the deterministic [ √ 2 + 1, posted-pricing schemes, based on the values of the remaining items. Both of our randomized and deterministic mechanisms share the first stage, which stops earlier than its analogues from the previous work. A remarkable property of the first stage, which we call pruning (similar to the pruning approach in the frugality literature [10, 20] ), is that it can be composed (in the sense of [1] ) with any truthful follow-up mechanism that runs on the items left to the second stage. The difference between our randomized and deterministic mechanisms lies in the follow-up postedpricing schemes: the randomized mechanism uses non-adaptive posted prices with the total sum below the budget, while our deterministic mechanism employees adaptive pricing that depends on whether previous agents accepted or rejected their posted-pricing offers.
Intuition behind our mechanism. The pruning stage of both mechanisms allows the buyer to reduce the choice complexity, and gives a reasonable upper bound on the payment to each remaining agent. At the same time, the value of the fractional optimum never decreases too much (it drops at most by a factor of two), and keeps even better when the true costs of the remaining agents constitute a non-negligible fraction of the budget. The idea behind the pruning is that the removed agents can be safely ignored by the mechanism, since the remaining items are sufficient to obtain the desired approximation to the fractional optimum. Also, it is natural for a mechanism to prefer the remaining items with higher value-per-cost ratios than the removed ones with lower ratios. We note that our pruning process based on the value-per-cost ratio is specific for the additive-valuation buyer. That is, it is still unknown how to extend such a pruning stage to more general classes of valuation functions.
The second stage of our randomized mechanism draws a random vector of budget-feasible posted prices. This is the same type of the mechanism as was used by Bei et al. [9] to obtain the tight approximation ratio of 2 for a subadditive buyer in the promise version of the problem (i.e., where the buyer is ensured to have a budget higher than the total cost of all items). Their result holds in the Bayesian setting, which by the minimax principle implies the existence of a randomized posted-pricing mechanism with the same approximation ratio in the worst-case setting. In our problem with the additive buyer, we explicitly construct a desired distribution over the posted price vectors. Such posted-pricing schemes seem to be useful and easily adaptable to more general classes of valuation functions.
Related Work
A complementary concept of budget-feasible mechanism design is frugality, for which the objective is payment minimization under the feasibility constraint on the set of winning agents. In that framework, there is a rich literature studying different systems of feasible sets, including matroid set systems [19] , path and k-paths auctions [5, 10, 12, 15, 27] , vertex cover and k-vertex cover [14, 17, 20] .
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design was proposed by Singer [24] . Beyond additive valuations, other more general classes of complement-free valuations also have been studied in the literature: submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive valuations. Singer provided an 112-approximation mechanism for submodular valuations [24] . This bound was improved to 7.91 and 8.34 for the randomized and the deterministic mechanisms by Chen et al. in [11] , and afterward it was improved to 4 and 5 by Jalaly and Tardos in [21] , respectively. For fractionally subadditive valuations, Bei et al. [9] gave a 768-approximation randomized mechanism. For the most general class of subadditive valuations, Dobzinski et al. [13] first gave an O(log 2 n)-approximation randomized and an O(log 3 n)-approximation deterministic mechanisms. Later, Bei et al. [9] proved the existence of O(1)-approximation budget-feasible mechanisms for the subadditive buyer. However, any explicit description of such a mechanism is still unknown.
There also have been many interesting and practically motivated adjustments to the original budget feasibility model. In particular, Anari et al. [4] investigated the variant with the additional large market assumption (i.e., every agent has a negligible cost compared to the whole budget) and attained the tight result of e e−1 for the additive buyer. Leonardi et al. [22] explored the additive model where the winning agents must form an independent set from a matroid. Amanatidis et al. [2, 3] probed into the variants with several important subclasses of submodular and fractionally subadditive valuations. Badanidiyuru et al. [6] studied the family of online pricing mechanisms in the budget feasibility model, motivated by practical restrictions imposed by the existing platforms. Balkanski and Hartline [7] obtained improved guarantees in the Bayesian framework. Goel et al. [16] considered more complex scenarios on a crowdsourcing platform, where the buyer hires the workers to complete more than one task. Balkanski and Singer [8] considered fair mechanisms (instead of truthful mechanisms) in the budget feasibility model.
PRELIMINARIES
In the procurement auction, there are n items for sale, each held by a single agent i ∈ [n] with a privately known cost c i ∈ R + and a publicly known value v i ∈ R + for the buyer. The buyer has an additive valuation function v(A) = i ∈A v i for purchasing a subset A ⊆ [n] of the items. By the revelation principle, we only consider direct-revelation mechanisms. Upon receiving bids b = (b i ) n i=1 of the claimed costs from the agents, a mechanism determines a set W ⊆ [n] of winning agents and the payments p = (p i ) n i=1 to the agents. In the budget feasibility model, any deterministic mechanism M is specified by an allocation
To indicate a specific coordinate of the bid vector b, or a bid vector without a given bidder i, we shall use notations b i and b −i . We are interested in truthful mechanisms that satisfy the following properties, for all bids b = (b i ) n i=1 and costs c = (c i ) n i=1 . • (Individual rationality and no positive transfer): 
It is well known (see [23] ) that truthfulness holds if and only if: (1) any allocation function 
In general, a mechanism may have randomized allocation and payments rules. We restrict our attention to randomized mechanisms that can be described as a probability distributions over truthful deterministic mechanisms, i.e., any particular realization of the randomized mechanism is a deterministic truthful mechanism that satisfies the above properties. A mechanism that can be described in this way is called universally truthful mechanism. We note that most of the previous work on budget feasible mechanisms only studies universally truthful mechanisms.
We denote by alg the value i ∈W v i derived from a deterministic mechanism, or the expected value E i ∈W v i in case of a randomized mechanism. We assume, without loss of generality, that c i ≤ B for each agent i ∈ [n], as i may not win when c i > B (due to the individual rationality and the budget feasibility constraints). If the buyer knows the private costs c = (c i ) n i=1 of the items, he would simply select the subset of items with the maximal total value, under the budget constraint.
Let opt denote the optimal solution to such Knapsack problem:
We also consider the fractional relaxation of the problem, and define its optimum as
While opt is NP-hard to calculate, finding fopt is easy: one greedily takes the items in the decreasing order of value-per-cost ratios ( (1),
, until the budget is exhausted or no item is left. Under our assumption 5 
We say that a mechanism is an α-approximation (with respect to the benchmark opt) if the value of alg is always at least 1 α -fraction of the value of opt corresponding to the Knapsack problem. In this work, we mostly compare the performance of a mechanism to the stronger benchmark fopt, i.e., the solution to the Fractional Knapsack problem.
COMPOSITION OF MECHANISMS: PRUNING
Each mechanism in this paper consists of two stages, and can be described as a composition of two consecutive mechanisms. The common first stage is called Pruning-Mechanism, serving to exclude the items with low value-per-cost ratios. Pruning-Mechanism possesses a remarkable composability property: the combination of it with any truthful follow-up mechanism M running on the output set S(r ) of Pruning-Mechanism is still a truthful mechanism. More concretely, the composition mechanism M = (x, p) of Pruning-Mechanism with a mechanism M = (x, p) works as follows:
Pruning-Mechanism
(1) Receive the pair (r, S(r )) from Pruning-Mechanism (2) Run mechanism M on the set S(r ):
(a) Select the winning set W from S(r ) according to M (b) Cap the payment with v i r , i.e., p i def = min(p i , v i r ), for each i ∈ W 5 Without this assumption, the gap between the two optima fopt opt can be arbitrary large.
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Proof. By
Step (2b) in Pruning-Mechanism, each item i ∈ S(r ) has a value-per-cost ratio at least r , which means c i ≤ v i r . Hence, capping the payment with v i r does not break individual rationality. Mechanism M is already budget-feasible, and mechanism M can only decrease the payment to each agent. We are only left to show that M is truthful.
First, we claim that any agent i ∈ S(r ) cannot alter the output of Pruning-Mechanism by manipulating his bid, unless he is excluded from set S(r ) because of an exorbitant bid. Formally, denote by (r ′ , S ′ (r ′ )) the output under another bid c ′ i c i , then (r ′ , S ′ (r ′ )) = (r, S(r )) whenever i ∈ S ′ . Indeed, if we represent the Pruning-Mechanism as a state machine parametrized by (r, S(r )), the exact value of agent i's bid only affects the transitions of the mechanism at the time when i is excluded from set S(r ). Thus, given that agent i belongs to the output set, his bid cannot change the output.
As mechanism M has a monotone allocation rule, so does the composition mechanism M. Indeed, if a losing agent i W claims a higher cost: (1) the increased bid does not help agent i to pass the first stage of Pruning-Mechanism; (2) given that agent i always gets selected in set S(r ) before and after increasing the bid, he will always lose in the truthful mechanism M, since the pair (r, S(r )) remains the same.
The payment of p i = min(p i , v i r ) is exactly the threshold bid for an agent i ∈ W to keep winning: the bid of v i r is the threshold bid to pass the first stage of Pruning-Mechanism; the bid of p i is the threshold bid to win in the second stage of mechanism M.
We show now several useful properties of the output (r, S(r )) of Pruning-Mechanism. 
Proof. In (a): the first inequality is due to Step (2b); the second inequality holds, since ratio r is initialized to be 1 B · max v i | i ∈ [n] , and never decreases during While-Loop. To prove (b), we observe that the first inequality is a reformulation of Stop-Condition of While-Loop. To prove the second inequality, we note that there are two possibilities that may lead to the termination of While-Loop, and r · B < v(S(r )) holds in both cases.
• [Increase of ratio r ]. Continuous increase of r implies r · B = v(T ) < v(S(r )).
• [Discard of an item k]. Value-per-cost ratio r is fixed before and after the discard. Before the discard, in that Stop-Condition has not been invoked,
The second inequality in (c) directly follows from (b). Via case analysis, we next verify the first inequality in (c). Let x = (x i ) n i=1 denote the solution to the Fractional Knapsack problem. We have either S(r ) ⊆ {i ∈ [n] | x i = 1} or S(r ) ⊇ {i ∈ [n] | x i > 0}. This claim comes as: (1) Pruning-Mechanism discards the items in the increasing order of value-per-cost ratios; but (2) the greedy algorithm takes the items in the decreasing order of value-per-cost ratios; and (3) in both processes, we break ties lexicographically.
• [When S(r ) ⊆ {i ∈ [n] | x i = 1}]. Observe that c(S(r )) ≤ B, and v i c i ≤ r for each item i S(r ). Hence, the total value of the items beyond set S(r )
This concludes the proof of all points (a), (b), and (c) in Lemma 3.2.
Mechanisms in the Second Stage. Based on Lemma 3.1, Pruning-Mechanism can be composed with any follow-up truthful mechanism. In fact, we focus on the class of simple posted-pricing mechanisms, with each mechanism parametrized 7 by a set of prices (B i ) i ∈S (r ) subject to i ∈S (r ) B i ≤ B. Such a mechanism naturally satisfies individual rationality, no positive transfer, budget feasibility, and truthfulness 8 .
To illustrate how to analyze the approximability of a two-stage pricing scheme, and as a warm-up exercise, we discuss below two simple mechanisms.
Warm-Up. In our first mechanism, we choose the higher-value subset of either {i * } or T as the winning set W , by offering price v i r to each item i ∈ {i * } or i ∈ T . As a result, we know from Our next pricing mechanism recovers the best known ratio of ( √ 2 + 2) by Chen et al. [11] . We show its approximability via case analysis.
. Item i * is the only winner, hence alg = v i * . By Lemma 3.2 (c),
[Case (2) :
There are two possibilities. First, when c i * ≤ B − v(T ) r , all items in set S(r ) together form the winning set W , i.e., alg = v(S(r )). By Lemma 3.2 (c), fopt ≤ 2·v(S(r )) = 2·alg. 7 To obtain our 3-approximation deterministic mechanism in Section 4, we actually use an adaptive pricing scheme. I.e., the take-it-or-leave price offered to each item i ∈ S (r ) may change, depending on whether the items that had made decisions before accepted or rejected their posted prices. 8 In case of a randomized mechanism, any realization is given by a particular set of budget-feasible posted prices (B i ) i ∈S (r ) , thus being a truthful deterministic mechanism. Accordingly, the randomized mechanism is universally truthful.
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r , only the items in set T are chosen as the winners, i.e., alg = v(T ).
When v i * < √ 2 · v(T ) and c i * ≤ B − v(T ) r , the above mechanism admits a 2-approximation. One might ask a natural question: is it possible to achieve a better trade-off between this 2-approximation case and the ( √ 2 + 2)-approximation cases? In the next section, we affirm this guess by presenting a slightly more complicated adaptive pricing scheme, resulting in a 3-approximation deterministic mechanism.
DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM
The warm-up mechanisms have merely a few possible outcomes, and do not adapt to the decisions of the items: either the highest-value item i * , or the remaining items T , or rarely both of item i * and items T win; the posted prices (B i ) i ∈S (r ) are almost all equal to the maximum possible values v i r i ∈S (r ) . Such rigid structure hinders those pricing mechanisms from achieving better performance guarantees than √ 2 + 2 -approximation. In this section, we introduce an improved adaptive pricing mechanism.
Deterministic-Mechanism(r, S(r )) (1) If v i * ≤ 1 2 · v(T ), get items T by offering price v i r to each item i ∈ T (2) Else if v i * ≥ 2 · v(T ), get item i * by offering price v i * r to i * (3) Else, i.e., when
When c i * > B i * , item i * will reject offer B i * , and then each item i ∈ T will accept offer B i .
We also call by the same name Deterministic-Mechanism the composition of two mechanisms: Pruning-Mechanism with Deterministic-Mechanism. Theorem 4.1. Deterministic-Mechanism is a 3-approximation mechanism (individually rational, budget-feasible, and truthful) against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Proof. Individual rationality, no positive transfer, and truthfulness are due to the pricing nature of Deterministic-mechanism, Lemma 3.1, and Lemma 3.2 (a). To show budget feasibility, we consider either Case (3b) or Case (3c) in the mechanism:
In the reminder of the proof, we focus on the approximation guarantee. Both of Case (1) and Case (2) in the mechanism, in which either v i * ≤ 1 2 · v(T ) or v i * ≥ 2 · v(T ), are easy to analyze. In either case, alg = max v i * , v(T ) and thus
where the first inequality comes from Lemma 3.2 (c), and the second inequality holds since either
From now on, we safely assume that 1 2 
Conditioned on either c i * ≤ B i * or c i * > B i * , we are only left to deal with Case (3b) and Case (3c).
, since otherwise item i would accept price B i and would actually get in set U . Thus,
By Lemma 3.2 (c), fopt ≤ v(S(r )) + r · B − c(S(r )) . We plug inequality (1) into it and get fopt (1) <v
[Case (3c) that c i * > B i * ]. By Lemma 3.2 (a), c i * ≤ v i * r , and
The winning set W = T , which means alg = v(T ). Hence,
Thus, 3 · alg ≥ fopt holds in all cases, which concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Matching Lower Bound
It turns out that our Deterministic-Mechanism reaches the best possible approximation ratio among all deterministic mechanisms, against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Here, we give an instance similar in spirit to the example of Singer [24, Proposition 5.2] with a matching lower bound of 3.
Theorem 4.2. No deterministic mechanism (truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible) has an approximation ratio less than 3 against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark, even if there are only three items.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a (3 − ε)-approximation deterministic mechanism, for some constant ε > 0. Consider the following two scenarios with three items having
Based on individual rationality, each winning item gains a payment of at least c * . To guarantee the promised approximation ratio of (3−ε) under budget feasibility, there is exactly one winning item. Without loss of generality, we assume that the winner is the first item. • [With costs (0, c * , c * )]. By truthfulness, item 1 wins once again, getting the same payment of at least c * . Thus, the budget left is at most (B − c * ) < c * . Due to budget feasibility and individual rationality, neither item 2 nor item 3 can win.
In the later scenario, the mechanism generates value alg = 1, yet the Fractional Knapsack benchmark
This contradicts our assumption that the mechanism is (3 − ε)-approximation, concluding the proof of the theorem.
MAIN RESULT: RANDOMIZED MECHANISM
In this section, we present the main result of our work, a randomized mechanism that achieves a 2-approximation to the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Given the matching lower bound by Chen et al. [11, Theorem 4.2] against the weaker Knapsack benchmark, this approximation guarantee is tight for both benchmarks. Our mechanism described below and called Randomized-Mechanism receives pair (r, S(r )) from Pruning-Mechanism as input, and runs in the second stage of the composition. The mechanism simply randomizes among non-adaptive pricing schemes.
Randomized-Mechanism(r, S(r ))
(3) Else, let q i * def = 1 2 and q T def = 1 2 − q (4) Offer price a B i * to item i * , where B i * is defined as follows:
(a) With probability q i * , let
We first verify that all quantities in Randomized-Mechanism are well defined.
Proof. The first inequality is due to Lemma 3.2 (b) that v(S(r )) > r · B. Lemma 3.2 further implies r · B ≥ v i * and r · B ≥ v(T ), i.e., r · B ≥ max v i * , v(T ) . Now, the second inequality in Lemma 5.1 follows, as
Finally, rearranging v(T ) ≤ r · B < v(S(r )) = v i * + v(T ) leads to the last two inequalities.
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Similar to Deterministic-Mechanism in Section 4, we also slightly abuse notations and also refer to Randomized-Mechanism as the composition of two mechanisms: Pruning-Mechanism with Randomized-Mechanism.
Theorem 5.2. Randomized-Mechanism is a 2-approximation mechanism (individually rational, budget-feasible, and universally truthful) against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Proof. Since Randomized-Mechanism is a pricing scheme, it is individually rational. Since each random realization of the prices (B i ) i ∈S (r ) is budget-feasible, i.e., i ∈S (r ) B i = B by construction, the mechanism is also budget-feasible. Note that (1) all random choices in Randomized-Mechanism, i.e., the prices (B i ) i ∈S (r ) , can be made before execution of the mechanism; and (2) for each such choice, the resulting pricing mechanism is obviously truthful. Due to Lemma 3.1, all desired properties extend to the composition mechanism, hence being individually rational, budget-feasible, and universally truthful.
In the rest of the proof, we show that Randomized-Mechanism is a 2-approximation to fopt. Let (x i ) i ∈S (r ) denote the allocation probabilities, then the mechanism generates an expected value of alg = i ∈S (r ) v i · x i . In order to prove the approximation guarantee, we need the following equation (2), inequality (3), and inequality (4), which will be proved later.
Indeed, these mathematical facts together with Lemma 3.2 (c) imply that 2 · alg ≥ fopt.
fopt ≤ v(S) + r · B − c(S) (2) = v i * + v(T ) + 2 · q i * · v i * + q T · v(T ) − r · c i * + c(T ) (3, 4) ≤ 2 · v i * · x i * + 2 · i ∈T v i · x i = 2 · alg.
Now, we are only left to prove equation (2), inequality (3) and inequality (4) .
[Equation (2)]. By the definitions of q i * and q T , in either case of Step (2) or
Step (3), 
Finally, our mechanisms use posted prices in the second stage. Besides the practical interest and motivation of posted-pricing mechanisms in the prior work, our work gives additional support to study this family of mechanisms in budget-feasible framework from a theoretical viewpoint.
